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Costs Under Capitalism and Communism
By H. Barger and W. T. Baxter
In the course of ordinary business, one of the chief aims of cost 
accounting is to discover the profitability or otherwise of each 
product or service that is sold by a given firm. With such informa­
tion at his finger tips, the executive of the firm in question can 
decide which line of activity to push. Considered from the stand­
point of the executive, the reason for employing a cost accountant 
is to secure the maximum profits for the firm. Private gain, 
however, is not the only result, for, as an economist would explain, 
if competition within the industry be keen, selling prices tend to 
be reduced to a fraction above total expenses. It follows that the 
activities of the costing department will also ensure that the 
ultimate consumer obtain what he wants at the lowest price.
In thus serving the business man—and incidentally the con­
sumer also—the cost accountant has a difficult job, one that often 
raises problems which appear almost incapable of a logical solu­
tion. For example, every student is well aware of the impossibil­
ity of ever finding a satisfactory method of allocating oncost in a 
works that turns out many varied products. Nevertheless, if we 
start to analyze the economic system under which we live, we 
soon see that the cost accountant is usually aided in his task by 
certain forces which, though of immense importance, we ignore 
because we have come to take them for granted. For in the first 
place, he is allowed to value everything in terms of money, how­
ever much your philosopher may disapprove this practice. And 
in the second, he lives under a regime of individualism, private 
enterprise, or laissez faire—call it what you will—and as a result, 
both buying and selling prices are fixed for him by the forces of 
competition. Outside of Russia, no single industrial enterprise 
or government department is yet the complete dictator of market 
conditions. The executive of the private undertaking has little 
control over the rates at which materials or labor can be bought, 
and, similarly, selling prices are mainly fixed by the interplay of 
independent factors. But in other times and places, concerning 
which most of us can only know by hearsay, cost accounting 
calculations have sometimes been made without reference to any 
monetary unit. What is more, competition has not always been 
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given free rein. The purpose of this article is to speculate upon 
the consequences for cost accounting of such departures from the 
use of money or from a competitive régime.
The first case is quickly dismissed. Consider our old friend 
Crusoe. When he was wondering whether to build a new hut, his 
costing calculations were real enough, even if they did not take the 
form of money reckonings. He simply weighed the pleasure of 
being housed against the discomfort of hewing timber under a 
tropical sun. His calculations dealt with intangibles, yet none 
the less they involved a process of costing—the comparison of in­
come against the sacrifice involved in its acquisition.
When, however, a community consists of more than one per­
son, exchange becomes necessary, and barter or (later on) money 
transactions become inevitable. Costing calculations cease to 
deal with intangibles and may be expressed in terms of concrete 
articles—be they slaves, barrels of pork, or dollars and cents. 
The only important example of a modern country trying to 
subsist without money is that of Russia during the civil-war 
period in 1920, and this curious experiment ended in abysmal 
failure.
We may pass therefore to the other case, in which the cost ac­
countant does not have the forces of competition to guide him. 
Outside of Russia, this situation is seldom encountered, since an 
enterprise must, if it is to be entirely sheltered from competition, 
possess a monopoly both on its buying and its selling sides. Such 
a combination is rare. A partial monopoly in the matter of sales 
is, however, not unusual. Now although an undertaking that 
controls the market for its product does not have to depend upon 
competition for the fixing of its selling prices, it must still buy 
labor and raw materials at prices fixed by competition, and so its 
accountant continues to estimate the cost of its products. His 
calculations still point to the items which yield the greatest profit, 
and since your monopolist normally aims at enriching himself as 
fast as possible, it is upon those items that the enterprise will con­
centrate. And, because the monopolist can choose his own selling 
price, he need no longer share his increased gains with the con­
sumer, as he would be forced to do under competition. That is, 
the cost accountant continues to be a valuable tool in the hands of 
his employer, but ceases to be the unconscious watch-dog of the 
consumer’s purse. An enlightened public opinion will see to it 
that this faithful watch-dog is never muzzled.
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Seen from this angle, much economic legislation, though it does 
not mention the cost accountant explicitly, is really designed to 
strengthen his position. Thus the whole of the anti-trust laws 
may be regarded as attempts to unfetter him in the interest of the 
public.
But to return to the cost accounting of the monopolist. His 
policy may well be much less simple than the foregoing discussion 
would suggest. He may find that he can make larger profits by 
charging different prices to different customers than by sticking to 
one uniform figure. Thus, for example, steel rings in Germany 
and the United States have often been able, thanks to high tariffs 
at home, to charge more in their own than in foreign countries. 
Such combines, having fixed home prices at levels sufficient to 
yield a profit after meeting prime and overhead costs, could in­
crease this profit substantially by dumping surplus goods abroad 
at any price that exceeded prime cost. It would be the function 
of the cost accountant employed by such a steel combine to de­
termine with the greatest possible accuracy the prime costs of the 
steel sold abroad. For the monopolist would never wish to sell 
below this figure, unless, of course, with the deliberate intention 
of ruining foreign competitors in order ultimately to obtain a 
monopoly in the foreign market also. But that is usually a 
hazardous proceeding.
Not all monopolies, however, are run simply with a view to 
making maximum profits. Where for technical reasons a product 
or a service is incapable of being exploited except by a monopoly, 
and where its price is a matter of wide public concern, the govern­
ment concerned usually puts a finger in the pie. The aim of the 
monopoly becomes tinged with benevolence. Not maximum 
profits but maximum service is its new keynote, if it is properly 
regulated. No longer will it charge as high a price as the market 
will bear; rather will it be content to cover its costs—as deter­
mined, of course, by its costing department. It may even decide 
to subsidize a socially valuable but financially unremunerative 
branch of its activities out of the excess profits of its more lucra­
tive operations. In general, of course, financial remunerative­
ness is the test of social value: one may often doubt how far 
people really want that for which they are evidently not prepared 
to pay. But there are other standards of value relevant in 
special circumstances, and these have often been applied in cases 
of monopoly. The post office, for example, makes large profits 
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by carrying letters from one city block to the next at what (viewed 
by itself) is really an exorbitant charge for doing so. But it 
uses some of this money to cover the much higher cost of carrying 
occasional post cards between remote townships. The same is 
true of the British post office. As the reader may possibly re­
member, one of the unexpected fruits of Irish self-government was 
an increase of a halfpenny in the Free State’s rate for letters; and 
we may presume that the British post office made a corresponding 
gain by ceasing to be responsible for a large tract of thinly popu­
lated territory. In England also the highly profitable mail de­
partment subsidizes its poor relation the telegraph: for the latter 
is always run at a loss, apparently as a matter of public policy. 
Obviously, the British post office, if run on a purely business 
basis, could substantially increase the already handsome surplus 
of £13,000,000 which it handed over to a grateful chancellor of 
the exchequer at the close of the last fiscal year. Both in America 
and Britain the unremunerative services are no doubt justified on 
social grounds, and at certain points the postmasters general can 
therefore legitimately disregard the data laid before them by their 
costing departments. It is, however, imperative that the cost 
calculations should still be made, lest congress or parliament 
might countenance the continuance of such unremunerative 
services with eyes closed to their expensiveness.
We have pointed out that monopoly usually involves a dis­
regard of the cost accountant’s figures through a fixing of selling 
prices at an artificial level. This results in the consumer paying 
more (or, sometimes, less) than the true economic price as meas­
ured by social cost. A slightly different distortion arises when 
the monopolist is able, because he is the only buyer, to fix his own 
purchase prices—that is, if he is what Mrs. Joan Robinson in her 
recent book The Economics of Imperfect Competition, calls a 
“monopsonist.” Thus New York clothing firms would appear 
to be to some extent monopsonists in engaging their workers, 
since the type of labor they buy has often no alternative opening 
for employment. Hence the bargaining position of the em­
ployee is peculiarly weak; and hence, also, the need for anti­
sweating laws. It is obvious that the figures of the cost account­
ant employed by such a monopsonist must underestimate the 
social sacrifice involved in the preparation of the sweated product. 
As a result, the inhabitants of Park Avenue have hitherto paid 
less for their wives’ (still expensive) gowns than is really justified 
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by the amount of sewing involved. Benevolent monopsonists 
are seldom found, though this phrase describes the U.S. Treasury 
during the months in which it bought gold from American pro­
ducers above the world price. Here its behavior must be justified 
on grounds which are not purely economic.
Each item in the foregoing catalogue of departures from a 
regime of strict laissez faire must be sufficient to disconcert any 
cost accountant brought up in the classical tradition of free 
enterprise. What, then, would be his feelings, were he trans­
ferred to an undertaking in present-day Russia, where he would 
have to deal simultaneously not only with each of these abnor­
malities but also with a host of other even stranger customs? 
Indeed, where competition is eliminated, and where everything is 
centrally planned and controlled, it might well be imagined that 
no costing calculations exist or are needed—at any rate so far as 
the individual enterprise is concerned. But this would be a 
mistake. The cost accountant is held in considerable esteem by 
the Soviet authorities. For political reasons, however, he is fre­
quently not permitted to work on a scientific basis, with disas­
trous consequences for the consumer. In no way can one come 
to a better understanding of the importance of accurate costing 
than by considering the confusion, waste and suffering that have 
resulted from the departure from sound accounting principles.
In Russia, the whole of industry (and agriculture, too) must 
conform—or at least make some show of conforming—to the pro­
gram constructed and periodically revised by the central plan­
ning authority (Gosplan). The plan specifies not only outputs, 
costs and prices, but also the profits to be earned. And the 
management of each individual unit must try to achieve the 
figures of the plan in the matter of profits, just as much as in the 
matter of any other item. If at the end of the year the profits of 
an enterprise are deficient or absent, the manager will have to face 
severe criticism, not indeed from a body of shareholders, but from 
the officers of Gosplan.
Now, outside of Russia, the profit-and-loss account of a private 
firm reflects on the one hand the management’s bargaining power 
in buying raw materials and labor and its salesmanship in dis­
posing of the product, and, on the other, the technical efficiency 
of its workshops. But the profit-and-loss account of a state 
enterprise in Russia reflects efficiency only. Its selling prices are 
specified in the plan. So, too, are the prices at which it buys 
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labor and raw materials. That is, a Russian cost accountant’s 
figures no longer measure bargaining power or salesmanship; they 
measure only skill at engineering and at factory organization. 
They become a valuable index of good internal management, 
although to some extent subsidies falsify their significance in this 
respect.
In a country as large as Russia, a very considerable degree of 
devolution in industrial matters is obviously essential. Outside 
the skeleton provided by the plan, the head of a local enterprise 
has, and must have, almost complete independence as to the con­
duct of his factory or farm. Hence the enormous importance of 
the cost accounts as an index by which the central authority may 
decide with what wisdom each individual manager is exercising 
his discretion. And hence, too, the importance of the costing 
department to the individual manager as a means of organizing 
his enterprise along the lines of maximum efficiency.
Costing, therefore, would at first sight appear to exercise much 
the same functions inside the individual factory as it does in 
western countries. But it is costing with a difference, and from 
the social point of view that difference is extremely significant. 
The matter may perhaps best be illustrated by considering each in 
turn of the principal ingredients of a costing calculation, and 
discussing the manner in which they are determined.
(1) Labor. The early communist dogma that all should have 
equal pay has long since gone by the board. Factories now pay 
whatever is necessary to attract the right kind of staff. Theo­
retically, every Russian who possesses a permit to work (nor­
mally given to all persons not in the bad books of the government) 
is free to move from one employment to another. As a result no 
factory can lower wages beyond a certain point, or its workers will 
migrate elsewhere. Labor costs are still mainly determined by 
competitive forces, as in other countries.
In Russia, however, these forces can on occasion be severely 
restricted in their operation. First, the government has the 
power to alter wages wholesale, either by direct decree or by 
subtler methods, such as currency manipulation. Further, the 
movement of labor between one place and another in response to 
a difference in wage rates may be checked by measures of various 
kinds, varying from mass moral persuasion to the withdrawal of 
housing permits and food cards. Consequently, any important 
industrial unit can to some extent choose what rate of wages it 
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will pay. In other words, it can make itself into a monopsonist, 
not unlike the sweatshop employer described above. If (perhaps 
for political reasons) a badly managed undertaking must be made 
to appear efficient, the government may sanction all manner of 
devices for securing lower wage rates. Unlike the sweatshop 
employer, however, the government is in a position to offer com­
pensations to the labor concerned. Should the workers show 
signs of effective resentment at receiving lower wages than could 
be obtained elsewhere, these compensations are brought into 
play. For example, the government, since it controls even retail 
trade, may quietly ordain that the prices of foodstuffs supplied to 
these workers shall be lowered. In this way the inefficient under­
taking is given a concealed subsidy, its costs are distorted down­
wards, and labor’s real reward is higher than its money earnings 
would suggest.
(2) Raw materials. The free market for labor may be re­
stricted: for raw materials there is no open market at all. The 
prices of everything the factory buys are specified in the plan— 
including of course the price of labor. But in the case of labor, 
as we have seen, a certain minimum must usually be paid, or 
labor of the type in question will not be forthcoming. Only in a 
convict camp can the government order people to do as they are 
told, irrespective of what they are paid. In the case of materials, 
on the other hand, even this limitation is absent. For the gov­
ernment can perfectly well order one enterprise to supply another 
with its products, whether or not the former considers that it is 
receiving a satisfactory price for them. The laborer can (within 
limits) sell his labor where he chooses: no such freedom is open to 
the individual unit in disposing of its products. Within limits, 
also, the consumer can buy what he likes: the sources of supply 
for the individual factory are already specified in the plan.
Not only are the prices of raw materials fixed by the govern­
ment even more rigidly than the price of labor, but there is even 
less certainty that they represent true social cost. If a post is 
peculiarly responsible, the plan must specify a higher reward, or 
the post will not be filled. That is, the higher social cost is re­
flected in a higher wage, to some extent at least. Not so with 
materials. A mineral may be particularly scarce, or particularly 
difficult to obtain, but in Russia its price need not be especially 
high on that account. The government has only to order the 
mines to deliver it, and the industry which makes use of it can 
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have supplies of the mineral as cheap as you like (even though 
other users go without). True, the mines in question will no 
longer show a profit unless they are subsidized in some other way: 
but as we have seen, this is not particularly hard to achieve.
(3) Overhead charges. So far as overhead charges consist of 
labor and material costs, the contents of the foregoing sections 
are applicable. In addition, overheads usually include services 
purchased (e.g. transport), rent and interest, all of which call for 
some consideration.
(a) Services. As a general rule, each of the undertakings 
subsidiary to industry is organized as a quasi-independent unit, 
charging prices fixed by the government. Usually such prices 
reflect costs fairly closely. Thus, for instance, railroad rates are 
based so far as possible on actual expenses of operation, a fact 
that will probably be of vital importance in determining the lo­
cation of the numerous villages that are being built along the 
Trans-Siberian railway.
(b) Rents. The land is national property, and the rents 
charged for occupation can therefore be fixed as the government 
sees fit. Buildings are also controlled by governmental bodies. 
At first the municipalities tended to assume this responsibility, 
but it has usually been found that greater efficiency results if a 
special corporation is given charge of this matter. Such cor­
porations endeavor to run at a profit like any other undertaking.
(c) Interest. For many purposes the accountant need not 
charge up the price of a firm’s capital as a cost. In the long view 
it must be included in cost, none the less, for in western countries 
no firm would think of beginning operations unless it showed some 
prospect of paying dividends, to say nothing of debenture interest. 
And a firm that got its capital for nothing would be said to have 
been subsidized. Yet in Russia many enterprises get their capi­
tal for nothing.
In Britain or the United States capital is mainly obtained from 
three sources: from the private subscriptions of individual in­
vestors, from undistributed profits and from the banks. In 
Russia few persons are rich enough to save anything worth talking 
about. Loans from the state bank and the profits of successful 
enterprises are therefore the chief source of capital. Many enter­
prises contrive to finance themselves out of their own profits. 
Others receive money from more (financially) successful enter­
prises or from the state bank, again without paying for it. The 
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orthodox Marxian theory is, of course, that interest represents 
no cost to anybody and should not be paid. And in this respect 
communist practice comes nearer to theory than in the more awk­
ward matter of “equal pay for all.”
And in a country where individual savers are seldom urged to 
thrift by means of a high rate of interest, and where the state 
bank and wealthy industrial undertakings can lend out what 
would otherwise only be lying idle, it is at first hard to see how 
capital in fact can cost anything. But however many roubles are 
lying idle in the bank, or in the coffers of some state trust, there 
can never be enough of them to finance all the capital develop­
ment that the government would desire. This, of course, the 
authorities fully realize: indeed they could scarcely avoid doing so, 
for in Russia scarcity of capital is one of the loudest complaints. 
And we in the west would regard—indeed, do regard—this 
scarcity of capital as a reason for treating its price as a cost and 
rationing it out to the highest bidder. For rationed it must be, 
and the state bank and the wealthy trusts could in fact charge 
just as much for their loans as borrowers are prepared to pay— 
were it not that such a proceeding would be considered too remi­
niscent of capitalism, if indeed not actually immoral.
But the Russians have a stronger reason for rationing capital 
upon an arbitrary basis rather than through the mechanism of a 
capital market. The enterprises that would offer most for, and 
therefore get, the supplies of fresh capital would be those that are 
making the largest profits. In the west there may be (and often 
are) good grounds for supposing that the most profitable are the 
most efficient and the most worthy of development. But in 
Russia, as sometimes the authorities must surely realize, profits are 
almost entirely artificial, or even accidental, and form little guide 
to social worth. Moreover, there is always the plan. Capital 
in the right place is essential for the fulfilment, or even part ful­
filment, of the plan. And there is no guarantee that the test of 
profit would put capital in the “right place,” from this point of 
view. This reflection reinforces the Russian’s moral scruples 
about the institution of a free market for capital and makes him 
more determined than ever not to include interest in costs.
Not only the distribution of fresh capital but also the total 
quantity available is entirely arbitrary. It is notorious that the 
first five-year plan, because of its emphasis upon capital develop­
ment, imposed the severest hardships upon the Russian consumer.
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Vast quantities of butter and other much needed foodstuffs were 
exported in order to pay for new machinery. Had a free capital 
market existed, the amount of resources available would have been 
automatically limited by the public’s willingness to save; that is, 
if interest were correctly included in cost, the consumer could have 
determined for himself whether to spend his money on butter or 
to invest it.
What is the result of all this? No doubt the government sees 
to it that the Russian accountant has plenty of figures on which 
to base his cost calculations. Impressive profit-and-loss accounts 
emerge at the end of each financial year. But their social sig­
nificance has entirely disappeared. No longer is it the well­
managed enterprise, or that producing some scarce but much 
needed product, which shows the biggest profits. No longer does 
the inefficient unit, or the one producing something of which there 
is already a surfeit, inevitably show a loss. Financial results 
cease to be a valuable guide, or indeed any guide at all, to the 
lines along which industry and agriculture should develop for the 
future. The plan settles all that; but figures of profitability are 
no help in constructing the plan.
There remains the other social function of the cost accountant 
—to keep a check on inefficiency. This, it is true, he can still do 
to some extent even in a Russian enterprise. A comparison of the 
financial results of a subsidized with those of an unsubsidized 
undertaking has of course no meaning: indeed, when one considers 
the essential artificiality of most Russian prices, one may well be 
puzzled at the exaggerated regard that the authorities show for 
capitalist standards of respectability in the matter of profit-and- 
loss accounts. But comparisons between the figures of a given 
factory or farm during years in which the subsidy remains static, 
or between factories in the same industry receiving identical sub­
sidies—such comparisons do reflect differences in efficiency. 
Similarly, whether or not in the end the accountant’s figures of 
profit and loss give an accurate picture of the degree of efficiency 
that has been obtained, the processes of his analysis at least are 
absolutely necessary for the maintenance of any standard of 
efficiency whatever. They may not measure good management 
in a firm, but they are at least essential to such good management, 
in Russia no less than elsewhere. For only with the help of cost­
ing systems is it possible to compare alternative methods of pro­
duction and to eliminate waste.
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It would appear, therefore, that the Russians fully appreciate 
the value of costing so far as the internal management of an enter­
prise is concerned, but fail to realize its importance when com­
paring different units in the same industry or different industries 
with one another. Perhaps it is not too much to say that the 
future of communism depends on the speed with which the 
soviet authorities wake up to a proper sense of the accountant’s 
worth. For only if the plan itself is based on his figures, can it 
satisfy the needs of the consumer in the full sense. In western 
countries the working of supply and demand ensures that cost ac­
countancy shall fulfill these wider functions in the service of the 
consumer. And the time may come when the Russian consumer 
will insist on receiving the same degree of protection. This article 
began by emphasizing the social usefulness of the cost accountant 
under a regime of private enterprise: and it ends by pointing out 
that he is equally essential to the well-being of a socialist com­
munity. In an age of universal insecurity, such a profession is 
perhaps not without its advantages.
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